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L Introduction
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently
held in NoDak Bancorporation v Clarke' that a merger in which the
majority shareholders forced the minority shareholders of an acquired bank
to accept only cash in exchange for their shares was permissible under the
National Bank Act.' The Eighth Circuit's NoDak opmion directly conflicts
* The author would like to express his appreciation to Professor David Millon and Jim
Lake for their assistance in the development of this Note.
1. 998 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1993).
2. See NoDak Bancorp. v Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1420 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
Comptroller had authority under National Bank Act to approve squeeze-out merger). The
merger at issue in NoDak involved the Liberty National Bank and Trust Company of
Dickinson (Liberty). d. at 1417 Liberty had operated as a national bank in North Dakota
since 1916. M. Prior to the merger, the plaintiff, NoDak Bancorporation (NoDak) owned
21 % of Liberty's outstanding shares, and the majority shareholder, DickinsonBancorporation
(Dickinson), owned 73 %. M. Under the merger plan, Liberty merged with an interim bank,
the New Liberty National Bank (New Liberty). Id. at 1418. New Liberty was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Dickinson created for the sole purpose of facilitating the merger. d.
The resulting bank also would be a wholly owned subsidiary of Dickinson, because NoDak
and the other minority shareholders of original Liberty could exchange their shares only for
cash, which would leave Dickinson as the sole shareholder of the postmerger Liberty bank.
M.
Liberty sought approval for the merger plan from the Comptroller of the Currency,
as required by the National Bank Act. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a) (1988). The Comptroller
approved the plan over NoDak's objections. NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1418. Adopting
the rationale and holding in Lewis v Clark, 911 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam),
the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota held that the Comptroller
lacked authority to approve the merger plan because it froze out the minority shareholders.
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, after analyzing the statute, the
federal regulations, and the case law interpreting the statute, held that the National Bank Act
permitted the merger in question, and that the Comptroller therefore had authority to approve
the transaction. M. at 1419.
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with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in Lewis v Clark.3 In Lewis, the Eleventh Circuit held that
without express statutory authority, the Comptroller of the Currency
(Comptroller) had no authority to approve a merger that required
shareholders holding stock of equal standing to take different forms of
consideration.4 At present, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits are the only
courts that have addressed whether the National Bank Act grants the
Comptroller authority to approve these "squeeze-out" mergers involving
national banks.5 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has
indicated that the Comptroller will continue to approve squeeze-out mergers
outside the Eleventh Circuit.6 Consequently, the issue of squeeze-out
mergers under the National Bank Act may confront other courts in the
future.
The Lewis and NoDak courts approached the question of whether
squeeze-out mergers7 are permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation
3. 911 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1990). The Comptroller's name is Robert L. Clarke,
not "Clark" as it appears in the case citation. The mistake first appeared in the district
court opinion. Lewis v. Clark, No. TCA 87-40135-MMP (N.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 1989), rev'd
and remanded, 911 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
4. Lewis v Clark, 911 F.2d 1558, 1560 (1lth Cir. 1990) (per curiam). In Lewis,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the
Comptroller had authority under § 215a of the National Bank Act to approve the merger
of Lewis State Bank into the closely held First Florida Bank, N.A. Id. at 1560. The
majority shareholder, First Florida Banks, Inc., a bank holding company, owned 99.34%
of Lewis State's stock, while the plaintiff, owned less than 1%. Id. at 1559. Lewis State
Bank was one of 12 subsidiary banks that First Florida Banks, Inc. merged into First
Florida Bank, N.A. Id. at 1560. Under the terms of the merger, the minority shareholders
were to receive cash for their shares, and the majority would receive stock in the merged
bank. Id. According to the Eleventh Circuit, § 215a did not expressly permit disparate
treatment of stockholders of the same class of stock. Id. Although the statute did not
prohibit squeeze-out mergers, the court reasoned that owners of the same class of stock
should not receive different treatment unless Congress specifically authorized such
treatment. Id. at 1561. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Comptroller did
not have authority to approve the squeeze-out merger under § 215a. Id.
5. NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1424.
6. See O.C.C. Interpretive Letter, 1992 WL 486327, at *3 (O.C.C. Oct. 2, 1992)
(indicating that O.C.C. would not object to proposed cash-out consolidation of multibank
holding company's Colorado-based national bank subsidiaries).
7 The term "squeeze-out merger" describes a transaction that forces minority
shareholders to surrender their stock in a corporation to the controlling majority in
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of the National Baik Act.' By framing the issue as a question of the
Comptroller's authority under the statute to approve such a merger, the
courts avoided the significant policy issues underlying the question of
whether the government should permit such mergers in the context of
national banks. This Note analyzes the policy considerations behind
allowing majority shareholders in national banks to employ squeeze-out
mergers to divest minority shareholders of their equity The Note begins
with a review of the treatment of squeeze-out mergers in the general
corporate context under state law, with a focus on the different New York
and Delaware approaches. 9 The Note then discusses current and tradition-
al justifications and criticisms regarding squeeze-out mergers involving
nonbank corporations.10
After exploring these general issues, the Note turns to squeeze-out
mergers that involve national banks, beginning with an analysis of the
reasoning in the NoDak and Lewis opinions." A review of the conflict
exchange for cash or some nonequity instrument. Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstem, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALEL.J. 1354, 1357 (1978). The
most common form of squeeze-out involves the merger of a corporation into its existing
parent or a shell corporation that the controlling shareholders have formed solely for that
purpose. Id. In Schreiberv Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985), the U.S. Supreme
Court stated: "A 'squeeze-out' merger occurs when Corporation A, which holds a
controlling interest in Corporation B, uses its control to merge B into itself or into a wholly
owned subsidiary The minority shareholders in Corporation B are, in effect, forced to sell
their stock." Id. at 3 n.1. Courts and commentators also refer to "squeeze-out" mergers
as "take-out," "freeze-out," or "cash-out" mergers. Richard A. Booth, The New Law of
Freeze-Out Mergers, 49 Mo. L. REv 517, 517 n.2 (1984).
8. See 12 U.S.C. § 215a (1988) (providing procedural requirements for merger of
national banks or state banks into national banks). Section 215a(a) grants the Comptroller
the authority to approve mergers under the Act: "One or more national banking associations
or one or more State banks, with the approval of the Comptroller, under an agreement not
inconsistent with this subchapter, may merge into a national banking association located
within the same State, under the charter of the receiving association." Id. § 215a(a)
(emphasis added).
9. See infra notes 17-52 and accompanying text (contrasting treatment of squeeze-
out mergers by Delaware and New York courts).
10. See infra notes 53-71 and accompanying text (discussing justifications and
criticisms commentators have offered regarding squeeze-out mergers).
11. See infra notes 72-113 and accompanying text (discussing Lewis and NoDak
opinions).
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between the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits follows. 2 The Note then
analyzes the scope of the National Bank Act, focusing on the legislative
history and the legal context m which Congress originally enacted and
subsequently amended the provisions governing national bank consolida-
tions. 3 The Note concludes that the legislative history and the prevailing
legal assumptions concerning the rights of minority shareholders indicate that
Congress did not intend to authorize squeeze-out mergers under the National
Bank Act. 4 In addition, the Note argues that the Comptroller's endorse-
ment of squeeze-out mergers is not only inconsistent with the National Bank
Act, but also fails to promote the federal policy of encouraging beneficial
consolidations m the banking industry "5 Finally, the Note recommends
that if Congress does decide to authorize squeeze-out mergers under the
National Bank Act, Congress should require that such transactions satisfy a
business purpose test defined by the regulatory objectives that the consolida-
tion policy seeks to promote.'
6
I. Squeeze-Out Mergers in the General Corporate Context
State courts have long struggled with the propriety of squeeze-out
mergers. 7 Because of the significance of Delaware's corporate law, many
state courts and legislatures have followed Delaware's example in the
development of their laws governing squeeze-out mergers."8 A notable
12. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (analyzing NoDak court's rejection
of Lewis decision).
13. See infra notes 124-80 and accompanying text (discussing legal assumptions and
legislative history of National Bank Act's merger and consolidation provisions).
14. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (concluding that Congress did not
intend to authorize squeeze-out mergers under National Bank Act).
15. See infra notes 206-20 and accompanying text (arguing that allowing national banks
to engage in squeeze-out mergers will not advance regulatory objectives of federal banking
agencies).
16. See infra notes 221-30 and accompanying text (discussing suggested business
purpose test for squeeze-out mergers involving national banks).
17 See Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv 624, 626-80 (1981) (providing historical account of judicial responses to
take-out schemes, including squeeze-out mergers).
18. See 1 F HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5:04, at26-27 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1993) (discussing treatment
of squeeze-out mergers in Delaware).
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exception to this pattern is New York, which takes a very different approach
to squeeze-out mergers.19
A. Squeeze-Out Mergers Under Delaware Corporate Law
The treatment of squeeze-out mergers under Delaware law has varied
over time. In the context of parent-subsidiary mergers, Delaware courts
have long applied a "fairness test. ''10 Under this test, a court carefully
scrutinizes the fairness of a transaction that the minority shareholders believe
to be tainted with self-dealing and price inadequacy 21 In 1957, the
Delaware legislature enacted a short-form merger statute applicable to
ninety-percent owned subsidiaries.' Initial minority shareholder challenges
to squeeze-out mergers under the Delaware short-form merger statute met
with little success.' These decisions clearly established the exclusivity of
the appraisal remedy for dissenting minority shareholders.24
19. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of squeeze-out
mergers under New York law).
20. See Sterling v Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952) (holding
that majority shareholder bore burden of establishing entire fairness of merger because
majority shareholder stood on both sides of transaction).
21. Id. at 110.
22. Act of June 5, 1957, ch. 121, sec. 6, § 253(a), 51 Del. Laws 186, 188 (current
version at DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (1991)).
23. See Stauffer v Standard Brands Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962) (holding that
purpose of short-form merger statute was to provide parent corporation with means of
eliminating minority shareholders' interest in enterprise), overruled by Roland Int'l Corp. v
Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del 1979), overruled by Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983); Coyne v Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Del. 1959)
(rejecting argument that § 253 of Delaware Code did not authorize take-out mergers on
grounds that § 253 clearly authorizes use ofcash as sole consideration in short form mergers).
But see Weiss, supra note 17, at 648-49 (suggesting that principal purpose of short-form
merger statutes and statutes authorizing cash as consideration in mergers was to provide
corporate managers with greater flexibility in structuring corporate combinations and not to
authorize them to effect squeeze-out mergers).
24. See Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80 (holding that absent fraud, appraisal was exclusive
remedy for minority shareholders disputing valuation of their stock). Most jurisdictions,
including Delaware, have "appraisal statutes" or "dissenters' rights statutes" that authorize
dissenting shareholders to demand that the corporation purchase their shares at fair value
when the corporation merges or consolidates. See 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 18,
§ 5:28, at 168-69 (discussing protection afforded to minority shareholders by statutory right
of appraisal). If the shareholders and the corporation fail to reach an agreement as to what
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With the rise in popularity of corporate squeeze-outs in the mid-
1970s, courts began to question the fairness of forcing a shareholder out of
equity participation at any price.' The Delaware courts responded to this
fairness issue by applying the "business purpose" doctrine in a trilogy of
cases decided in the late 1970s.26 In Singer v Magnavox Co.,27 the
Delaware Supreme Court abruptly abandoned its prior adherence to the
exclusivity of the appraisal remedy 28 The court concluded that in a
parent-subsidiary merger, the minority shareholders were entitled to
constitutes a fair price, the statutes provide for judicial appraisal of the shares to determine
the purchase price. Id. at 169.
25. See Booth, supra note 7, at 518-19 (describing reasons for development of
business purpose rule in Delaware).
26. See Roland Int'l Corp. v Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1036-37 (Del. 1979) (applying
Singer business purpose test to short-form merger through which parent owning 97.6% of
subsidiary attempted to eliminate 329 public shareholders), overruled by Weinberger v
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Singer v Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-78
(Del. 1977) (holding that merger for sole purpose of squeezing out minority was breach of
fiduciary duty), overruled by Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Tanzer
v International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Del. 1977) (applying Singer
business purpose test to parent-subsidiary merger), overruled by Weinberger v UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
27 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
28. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del. 1977), overruled by
Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). In Singer, the Delaware Supreme
Court considered whether majority shareholders violated their fiduciary obligation to
minority shareholders by carrying out a corporate merger for the sole purpose of freezing
out the minority shareholders on a cash-out basis. Id. at 972. The merger involved
Magnavox and T.M.C. Development Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of North
American Philips Corporation, which recently had acquired a controlling interest in
Magnavox through a cash tender offer. Id. at 971. According to the Singer court, the
majority had a fiduciary duty to the minonty with respect to the minority's stock
ownership. Id. at 976. Moreover, the majority could not meet this duty by merely
relegating the minority to the statutory appraisal proceeding because, as the Singer court
noted, investors have a legitimate interest in the form, as well as the value, of their
investments. Id. at 977-78. The Singer court cited a number of decisions in which the
Delaware Supreme Court had held that the use of corporate power to perpetuate control
violated the controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty ld. at 979-80. The court stated that
by analogy, the "use of corporate power solely to eliminate the minority is a violation of
that duty " Id. at 980. Consequently, the Singer court held that a merger for the sole
purpose of squeezing out a minority shareholder constituted a breach of the majority's
fiduciary duty Id.
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judicial scrutiny of the merger terms to determine their fairness. 29 If the
terms were not fair, the reviewing court should provide the minority
appropriate equitable relief.3" More significantly, the court held that the
majority cannot satisfy the fairness test merely by demonstrating that the
merger price was fair.3 The court, stating that purpose was also relevant,
explained that a majority shareholder could not effectuate a merger "for the
sole purpose of eliminating a minority on a cash-out basis."32 In order to
state a claim for unfairness under Singer, the plaintiff had to allege the lack
of a legitimate business purpose for the squeeze-out merger, the inadequacy
of the price offered to the minority shareholders, and the minority's
inability to veto the transaction.33 However, the Delaware Supreme Court
in Singer did not indicate what would constitute a valid business purpose
for the elimination of the minority shareholders' interest.34
29 Id. at 977
30. Id.
31. Id. at 977-78.
32. Id. at 978.
33. See Harman v Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 496 (Del. 1982) (describing
essential elements of Singer fairness claim).
34. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980. Although the Singer decision was silent as to what
benefits would constitute a valid business purpose, the Delaware Supreme Court soon
provided a partial answer to that question in Tanzer v International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d
1121 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). In
Tanzer, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the court of chancery's denial of injunctive relief
against a parent corporation that had cashed out the minority shareholders of a subsidiary
corporation in order to facilitate the parent corporation's ability to borrow. Id. at 1125. In
holding that a freeze-out merger between a parent corporation and its subsidiary for the sole
benefit of the parent did not violate the Singer business purpose rule, the Delaware Supreme
Court accepted the court of chancery's conclusion that the purpose of the merger was to
"facilitate long term debt financing by [the parent corporation]" and that such a purpose was
a "legitimate and present and compelling business reason" to freeze out the minority Id. at
1124.
This was not the case with the merger at issue in Young v Valhl, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372
(Del. Ch. 1978). In Young, the court of chancery determined after an evidentiary hearing
that the purpose of the merger was simply to eliminate the minority shareholders "by
whatever means as might be found to be workable." Id. at 1378. The Young court
considered the validity of a proposed merger of a subsidiary, Valhi, Inc., into its parent,
Contran Corporation. Id. at 1373. Contran claimed two business purposes for the merger:
first, to realize tax savings by allowing Contran to offset continuing tax losses against Valhi's
recent gains from the sale of a portion of its business; and second, to avoid future conflicts
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Whatever potential force the business purpose test may have had,
subsequent decisions severely limited the significance of the test. Shortly
after the Delaware Supreme Court decided Singer, the court held that the
business purpose need not be that of the subsidiary; a merger effected solely
to advance economic objectives of the parent satisfied the Singer business
purpose rule.'5 Of course, this holding largely negated the efficacy of the
business purpose test: Few (if any) parent corporations would even propose
a venture from which they did not expect to benefit economically 36
Weakened from the start, the Singer standard came to its final demise
in the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v UOP, Inc.,'
which signaled the end of the business purpose test in Delaware.3" In
of interest between Contran and Valhi that would exist if they were to operate in the same
general lines of business. Id. at 1376-77 The court found both of these purported purposes
unconvincing. First, the merger would have resulted in tax savings of only $150,000
(approximately $.34 per share), which Contran could have achieved by other means. Id. at
1377 Moreover, the court found the possibility of future conflicts of interest "somewhat
contrived" because Contran was essentially a holding company, over 90% of the assets of
which consisted of Valhi's common stock, and because past conflicts of interest between
Valhi and Contran had been minimal. Id. The court of chancery considered the proposed
merger in Young the "prototype" of the mergers that the Delaware Supreme Court sought to
prevent in the Singer and Tanzer decisions and thus granted injunctive relief to the minority
shareholders. Id. at 1378.
See generally Allen M. Terrell, Jr. & Alesia Ranney-Marmelli, What Constitutes a
Valid Purposefora Merger?, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 852 (1978), for a further discussion of business
purpose as construed in Delaware and other jurisdictions.
35. See Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1123-24 (holding that parent company did not breach its
fiduciary duty as majority stockholder in subsidiary by effecting merger primarily to advance
its own business purpose).
36. See Booth, supra note 7, at 527 (arguing that Delaware courts severely limited
business purpose test by recognizing business purpose of parent corporation).
37 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
38. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (holding that
business purpose requirement would no longer apply in context of parent-subsidiary mergers).
In Weinberger, the Supreme Court of Delaware considered the applicability of the business
purpose rule to squeeze-out mergers in the parent-subsidiary context. Id. at 703-04.
According to the Weinberger court, the requirement of a business purpose represented a
departure from prior case law. Id. at 715. The Weinberger court concluded that with the
availability of the traditional fairness test, the expanded appraisal remedy, and the broad
scope of equitable relief, the business purpose requirement of Singer and its progeny did not
afford minority shareholders any additional meaningful protection. Id. Consequently, the
Weinberger court held that the business purpose requirement was no longer in force or effect
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Weinberger, the court reviewed a squeeze-out merger by a parent corpora-
tion that was a majority shareholder of a subsidiary 11 The plaintiffs,
representing minority shareholders who opposed the cashing out of their
interest in the subsidiary, attacked the validity of the transaction and sought
to set aside the merger.' The court found for the plaintiffs because the
transaction did not meet the requirements of fair dealing and fair price.4
More importantly, however, the Weinberger court eliminated the Singer
trilogy's business purpose requirement.42 Weinberger replaced the business
purpose rule with a requirement of fair dealing. In elimnating the business
purpose rule, Weinberger liberalized the appraisal remedy and held that in
ordinary circumstances, a minority shareholder's right to an appraisal should
be the exclusive remedy in squeeze-out cases.43 The Weinberger court
preserved the power of courts of equity to fashion appropriate relief only in
cases of fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, waste, and overreaching.'
with respect to parent-subsidiary mergers. Id.
39. Id. at 703.
40. Id.
41. Id. at711.
42. Id. at 715.
43. Id. at 714.
44. Id. Delaware courts may exercise the equitable powers of relief that the Delaware
Supreme Court preserved in Weinberger, even in cases not involving fraud or deception. See
Rabkin v Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104-05 (Del. 1985) (rejecting trial
court's interpretation of Weinberger as mandating appraisal as sole remedy for minority
shareholders who do not allege nondisclosure or misrepresentation by majority shareholders).
In Rabkin, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy
in a cash-out merger. Id. at 1100. An assertion of procedural unfairness affecting the offer
price was the essential basis of the minority shareholders' claims. Id. The Rabkn plaintiffs
claimed that the terms of the proposed merger were grossly inadequate because the majority
shareholder unfairly manipulated the timing of the merger to avoid a contract provision that
would have required the majority to pay the minority a higher price. Id. at 1103. The trial
court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that a minority shareholder's sole
remedy under Wemberger was an appraisal absent claims of fraud or deception. Id. The
Delaware Supreme Court, rejecting the trial court's "narrow" interpretation of Weinberger,
noted that the Weinberger court had indicated that the timing, structure, negotiation, and
disclosure of a cash-out merger each had a bearing on the issue of procedural fairness. Id.
at 1104. The Rabkn court, focusing on the majority shareholder's delay in effecting the
squeeze-out until after the expiration of the contract provision, reasoned that the alleged
unfair manipulation by the majority suggested a type of overreaching that went beyond the
issue of fair price. Id. at 1107 Noting Weinberger's recognition of the limitations of an
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Thus, minority shareholders of Delaware corporations again found
themselves at the mercy of the appraisal process.
B. Squeeze-Out Mergers Under New York Corporate Law
Unlike Delaware, the New York courts continue to require that
squeeze-out mergers have an independent bona fide business purpose, in
addition to the requirements of fair dealing and fair price.45 In Alpert v 28
Williams Street Corp.,' the New York Court of Appeals established the
standard for judicial review of the legitimacy of squeeze-out mergers in New
York.47 Under this analysis, a reviewing court should consider the merger
as a whole to determine whether the transaction involved "fraud, illegality,
or self-dealing,t" whether the minority shareholders received fair treatment,
appraisal under such circumstances, the Rabkin court concluded that the trial court should not
have dismissed the plaintiffs' procedural fairness claims on the grounds of the exclusivity of
the appraisal remedy Id.
45. See Alpert v 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 27-28 (N.Y 1984) (holding
that fair dealing and fair price alone would not render squeeze-out merger acceptable).
46. 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y 1984).
47 See Alpert v 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 27-28 (N.Y 1984) (holding
that court in equitable action to review squeeze-out merger should examine transaction as
whole for fair dealing, fair price, and existence of independent corporate purpose for
merger). In Alpert, the New York Court of Appeals considered a corporate transaction that
forcibly eliminated minority shareholders by means of a "two-step" merger. Id. at 24. A
two-step merger involves acquisition of a target corporation by an outside investor who first
purchases a majority interest in the target corporation. Id. at 22. The investor then uses this
newly acquired control to merge the target corporation with a second corporation already
under the investor's control, contingent upon the squeezing out of the minority shareholders
by a forced cash-out of the minority's shares. Id. The Alpert court noted that "the potential
for self-dealing requires careful scrutiny of the transaction" in instances in which majority
shareholders have an interest on both sides of a merger. Id. at 26. Moreover, the Alpert
court stated that the majority had a fiduciary duty to treat all shareholders equally Id. at 27-
28. Thus, the court reasoned that fair dealing and fair price alone would not render the
merger valid. Id. at 27
However, theAlpertcourt recognized that the majority shareholders had an overriding
managerial duty that required them to act for the benefit and welfare of the corporation and
the shareholders as a whole. Id. at 28. Thus, the court concluded that the advancement of
a general corporate interest in the context of a squeeze-out merger would justify disparate
treatment of the minority shareholders. Id. According to the court, the capital considerations
driving the merger at issue were valid business objectives. Id. at 29 Consequently, the
Alpert court concluded that the majority shareholders acted with a legitimate business
purpose, and the court therefore upheld the merger. Id.
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and whether any independent corporate purpose for the merger existed.48
Under the Alpert standard, a merger must be for the benefit of the corpora-
tion.49 The Alpert court explained that what distinguished a proper
corporate purpose from an improper one was whether the removal of the
minority shareholders advanced the goal of conferring some general benefit
upon the corporation, such as improving the structure of management or
increasing the corporation's capital." According to the court, a merger for
the sole purpose of reducing the number of profit sharers would not
constitute a proper corporate purpose." But the standard that Alpert
produced does not require that a legitimate squeeze-out merger with a bona
fide business purpose represent the only or even the best means of achieving
the corporate objective. 2
IlL Criticism and Defense of Squeeze-Out Mergers
A. Justifying Squeeze-Out Mergers
Under nineteenth-century corporate law, courts had little tolerance for
transactions designed to force minority shareholders to surrender their
ownership interest in a corporation. 3 This approach reflected the view that
each individual shareholder had vested rights in the corporation, which the
others could not alter or extinguish without the shareholder's consent.54
48. Id. at 28.
49. Id.
50. Id. The Alpert court stated that the purpose of the merger at issue was to enable
the corporation to attract additional capital to effect needed building repairs and that the
needed outside capital would have been available only through a merger that eliminated the
minority's interest. Id. at 29 Consequently, the court concluded that a bona fide business
purpose to facilitate a general corporate interest of obtaining increased capital justified the
exclusion of the minority shareholders from the merger. Id.
51. Id. at28.
52. Id.
53. See Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests In Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of
Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP L. 1, 2 (1983) (describing early vested rights
cases).
54. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 134 (1991) (noting difficulty of forcing out shareholders at common
law); I O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 5:03, at 11 & n.4 (describing common-law
theory of vested rights).
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The rule of shareholder unanimity created the potential for serious holdout
problems55 and impeded economic progress by frustrating many efficient
corporate transactions.56 These problems prompted many state legislatures
to enact statutes authorizing corporations to engage in a variety of activities
without unanimous shareholder approval.' Following the lead of these
liberalizing statutes, courts eventually abandoned the notion of vested
rights.58
Modem courts and commentators have offered various justifications
for liberalizing the treatment of squeeze-out mergers. The Weinberger court
recognized that price is often the principal consideration in a squeeze-out
merger. 9 With this emphasis on the fairness of the cash-out price, the
Weinberger court's faith in the appraisal process as the proper remedy to
assure fair valuation for equity should come as no surprise.) Moreover,
given the often divergent investment interests of the majority and minority
shareholders, a squeeze-out merger effected at a fair or premium price may
benefit both groups.6" A smilar argument suggests that if minority
shareholders create pressure for short-term profitability at the expense of the
long-term prosperity of the enterprise, prudent management dictates the
55. See Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 138 A. 772,775 (N.J. Ch. 1927) (involving
plaintiff who bought shares for purpose of commencing suit or compelling majority
shareholders to buy out stock at price that plaintiff set); In re Timmis, 93 N.E. 522, 523
(N.Y 1910) (noting that requirement of shareholder unanimity gave dissenting shareholders
power to extract holdout price from majority shareholders).
56. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 629 (noting that requirement of unanimous consent
for fundamental changes in corporate structure created potential for tyranny by minority).
57 See id. (describing liberalizing statutes that authorized corporations to carry out
various fundamental transactions upon consent of majority or supramajority of shareholders).
58. See 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 5:03, at 17 n.5 (noting that
Delaware courts virtually abandoned vested rights theory after its high point in 1930s);
Weiss, supra note 17, at 629-57 (describing historical liberalization of law relevant to take-out
mergers prior to Singer).
59. Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
60. See id. at 714 (stating that courts ordinarily should confine minority shareholders
remedy to appraisal).
61. See Arthur M. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV 987, 1015 (1974) (suggesting that majority shareholders generally have
long-term, business-oriented investment objectives, whereas minority shareholders invest for
short-term, market-performance-oriented objectives).
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elimination of the minority 62 Furthermore, a squeeze-out is an effective
way for the majority to expel troublesome minority shareholders without
running the risk of minority holdouts.63 These arguments comport with
legislative efforts to accommodate corporate flexibility through liberalization
of the state merger statutes.' Finally, cost savings attainable through the
elimination of minority shareholders may justify squeeze-out mergers in
some circumstances. 65
B. Criticism of Squeeze-Out Mergers
Despite the arguments offered to justify squeeze-out mergers, the long-
standing judicial intolerance of these transactions is not without merit.
Notwithstanding the apparently inequitable treatment of the minority
shareholders, some critics argue that the substantial opportunity for abuse by
the majority requires a per se prohibition on such transactions.' The fact
that self-interested majority shareholders set the cash-out price raises serious
questions about whether the minority will receive fair value for its shares.67
Moreover, the accessibility of the appraisal remedy, regardless of how
liberal, does not always provide adequate protection.68 Even if a minority
62. Id. at 1007
63. See James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal
Right, 77HARV L. REV 1189, 1196 (1964) (noting that courts have recognized that business
purposes justify elimination of minority shareholders seeking to use their veto power to exact
improper concessions from majority).
64. See Borden, supra note 61, at 1025-27 (arguing that short-form merger statutes
represent substantive determination that squeeze-outs are socially desirable transactions when
they involve statutorily prescribed percentage of shares, and that such statutes reflect
legislative policy to expand corporate options-and, thus, to enhance economic develop-
ment-at expense of basic shareholder rights).
65. See td. at 1007-08 (arguing that elimination of minority shareholders would save
administrative costs and managerial resources directed toward disclosure requirements,
shareholder relations, auditing, and legal matters).
66. See id. at 1020 (concluding that squeeze-outs should rarely, if ever, be permissible
in closely held corporations); Brudney & Chirelstem, supra note 7, at 1367-70 (recommend-
ing prohibition of "going private" mergers).
67 See Borden, supra note 61, at 1019-20 (explaining that price problem is more
aggravated in context of close corporation because of additional difficulty in estimating fair
cash-out price in absence of market price).
68. See 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 5:31 (discussing procedural
difficulties and costs associated with asserting appraisal rights); Vorenberg, supra note 63,
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shareholder receives a fair price for the shareholder's stock, "fairness"
encompasses more than a fair price; the shareholder also has an interest in
the form of the shareholder's investment.69 A squeeze-out merger not only
deprives a minority shareholder of the investment form, but also may subject
the shareholder to unanticipated tax liabilities.7' Also, majority sharehold-
ers typically attempt squeeze-outs at a time when business is about to
improve or is improving and thus deny the minority an opportunity to share
in future profits.71
IV The Conflict over Squeeze-Out Mergers
Under the National Bank Act
A. The Eleventh Circuit's Reasoning in Lewis v Clark
Although the legitimacy of squeeze-out mergers under state corpora-
tion law has received a considerable amount of judicial scrutiny, Lewis v
Clark' was the first case to address the issue in the context of national
banks. The transaction at issue in Lewis involved a merger between Lewis
State Bank (Lewis State) and First Florida Bank, N.A. (First Florida).
Under the terms of the merger, the Lewis State minority shareholders
received cash for their shares, while the majority shareholders received stock
in the surviving bank.7' Both banks were subsidiaries of First Florida
Banks, Inc. (First Florida Banks), a bank holding company that owned over
at 1201 (suggesting that even best appraisal procedures fail adequately to protect minority
shareholders because steps required to exercise appraisal rights inevitably involve delay,
uncertainty, and unrecoverable expenses).
69. See Singer v Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977-78 (Del. 1977) (recognizing that
investors have legitimate interest in form as well as value of investments), overruled by
Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 497 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Victor Brudney, A Note On "Going
Private," 61 VA. L. REv 1019, 1023 (1975) (noting that even if minority shareholder
receives fair value for stock, shareholder still faces cost and risk of locating comparable
investment).
70. See Vorenberg, supra note 63, at 1203 (arguing that most significant consequence
to displaced shareholder often is impact of federal capital gains tax upon any appreciation in
stock value).
71. See Borden, supra note 61, at 1020 (suggesting that minority shareholders,
particularly those in close corporations, often are not market-oriented investors, but are
seeking, and should be able to enjoy, long-term benefits).
72. 911 F.2d 1558 (lth Cir. 1990).
73. Lewis v Clark, 911 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
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ninety-nine percent of Lewis State's stock.74 First Florida Banks initiated
the merger as part of a larger plan to merge the holding company's twelve
subsidiary banks into the company's lead bank, First Florida.7' The
plaintiffs, minority shareholders of Lewis State stock, opposed the
transaction and sought judicial review of the Comptroller's approval of the
merger and appraisal of their stock.76 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Florida upheld the merger and entered a final order
affirming the Comptroller's actions. 7
The appellees in Lewis-the Comptroller and First Florida-argued
that section 215a of the National Bank Act permits the use of cash as
consideration in mergers.7" The appellees further argued that the statute
does not contain any provisions that explicitly prohibit squeeze-out
mergers.79 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed both of these arguments. 80 The court stated that although section
215a allows for the use of cash in a merger, the statute does not expressly
permit stockholders of the same class to receive different treatment.8 ' The
court reasoned that while the statute does not expressly prohibit squeeze-out
mergers, the statute also does not specifically allow for the disparate
treatment of owners of the same class of stock.' The court concluded that
74. Id. at 1559-60.
75. Id. at 1560.
76. Id.
77 Id. In sustaining the Lewis merger, the district court relied upon Beloff v
Consolidated Edison Co., 87 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y 1949) and Grimes v Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., 392 F Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aft'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975).
Lewis, 911 F.2d at 1560. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished both of these cases because they
involved publicly traded corporations. Id. Accordingly, the Lewis court concluded that these
decisions were not applicable to the merger of Lewis State into the closely held First Florida.
Id.
78. Id., see 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a)(3) (1988) (requiring merger agreement to specify
stock and cash amounts). Section 215a(a)(3) states that the merger agreement shall "specify
the amount of stock (if any) to be allocated, and cash (if any) to be paid, to the
shareholders of the association or State bank being merged into the receiving association."
Id. (emphasis added).
79. Lewis, 911 F.2d at 1561.
80. Id. at 1560-61.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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the absence of an explicit congressional endorsement constituted an effective
prohibition of such discrimnatory practices.'
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the argument that minority and
majority shareholders were not similarly situated and, therefore, were not
entitled to equal treatment.' The court observed that this argument
ignored the "longstanding equity tradition of protection of minority
shareholders m American jurisprudence." '  The court concluded that
because the legislative history does not expressly reject that tradition,
Congress did not intend for the statute to depart from this tradition.'
Consequently, the Lewis court held that the Comptroller did not have the
authority under the statute to approve the merger.87
B. The Eighth Circuit's Reasoning in
NoDak Bancorporation v Clarke
The plaintiff in NoDak Bancorporation v Clarke,88 NoDak Bancor-
poration (NoDak), was a minority shareholder in Liberty National Bank and
Trust Company of Dickinson (Liberty).89 The majority stockholder of
Liberty, Dickinson Bancorporation, Inc. (Dickinson), proposed a merger
between Liberty and New Liberty National Bank (New Liberty).' New
Liberty was a wholly owned subsidiary of Dickinson created for the sole
purpose of facilitating the transaction. 9' The terms of the merger called for
NoDak and the-other minority shareholders to exchange their shares of
Liberty for cash, leaving Dickinson as the sole shareholder of the newly
merged bank.' NoDak objected to this cash-out plan, arguing that the
proposed merger lacked a legitimate business purpose, constituted a breach
of fiduciary duty, and squeezed out the minority shareholders for less than
83. Id. at 1561.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Southern Pac. Co. v Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919)).
86. Id.
87 Id.
88. 998 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1993).
89. NoDak Bancorp. v Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1417 (8th Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 1417-18.
91. Id. at 1418.
92. Id.
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fair value.93 The Comptroller considered NoDak's objections, but
ultimately approved the proposed merger.9' NoDak filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of North Dakota, alleging that the
Comptroller's approval of the cash-out merger violated section 215a.9
The appellants m NoDak-the Comptroller, Liberty, and Dickin-
son-argued that section 215a(a)(3) of the National Bank Act,' which
specifically mentions both stock and cash as acceptable forms of payment,
indicates that the statute permits minority squeeze-out mergers.' Accord-
ing to the appellants, if a purchaser under the National Bank Act can give
cash m exchange for a target bank's stock, then the statute clearly anticipates
squeeze-out mergers.9" Conversely, NoDak argued that section 215a(a)(3)
does not specifically allow an acquiring bank to differentiate between
shareholders of the same class of stock by giving stock in exchange for some
of the acquired shares while giving cash in exchange for other shares."
NoDak further asserted that squeeze-out mergers were mconsistent with the
auction provision of section 215a(d)."° Finally, NoDak argued that the
overriding purpose of section 215a is to protect minority shareholders' rights
and that a squeeze-out merger represents an inherently unfair abuse of those




96. See 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a)(3) (1988) (describing information that merger agreement
must include). Section 215a(a)(3) requires that a merger agreement specify "the amount of
stock (if any) to be allocated, and cash (if any) to be paid, to the shareholders of the
association or State bank being merged into the receiving association." Id.
97 NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1419.
98. Id.
99 Id.
100. Id., see 12 U.S.C. § 215a(d) (1988) (providing for public auction of stock
originally allocated for dissenting shareholders). Section 215a(d) provides for the public
auction of the shares that "would have been delivered to such dissenting shareholders had they
not requested payment." Id. NoDak argued that this language gives the dissenting
shareholders the right to bid at auction on the stock that they would have received instead of
cash. NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1420. NoDak asserted that the statute does not permit
the forcible cashing out of the dissenting shareholders, because the dissenters always have the
right to buy their stock back at auction. Id.
101. Id. at 1419-20.
779
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in assessing
these two conflicting interpretations, focused on the specific language found
in section 215a."° The court reasoned that the text of section 215a(a)03
indicates that a specific merger plan may be acceptable even without explicit
statutory approval."' 4 Recognizing that the statute does not specifically
address squeeze-out mergers, the court analyzed the Comptroller's
interpretation of the statute under traditional administrative law princi-
ples. 05 The court concluded that the plain language of section 215a(a)(3)
supports the Comptroller's view that the statute anticipates a merger
involving the use of stock as consideration for some shares and cash as
consideration for others."16
The Eighth Circuit also reasoned that regulations, legislative history,
and case law supported its interpretation.'17 The court noted that the
regulations governing national bank mergers clearly do not anticipate that
102. Id. at 1419.
103. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a) (1988). Section 215a(a) reads in part: "One or more national
banking associations or one or more State banks, with approval of the Comptroller, under an
agreement not inconsistent with this subchapter, may merge into a national banking
association located within the same State, under the charter of the receiving association." Id.
(emphasis added).
104. NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1419. In concluding that section 215a(a) permits
approval of merger plans not explicitly authorized, the NoDak court read the double negative
in the statutory language to mean that the statute allowed any type of merger agreement "not
inconsistent with this subchapter." Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. §215a(a) (1988)). According to
the NoDak court, a merger is acceptable under section 215a(a), so long as the merger
complies with the technical requirements of the statute. Id.
105. Id. at 1420; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding that court should defer to agency interpretation that is
reasonable within meaning of statute when statute is ambiguous).
106. NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1420. The NoDak court argued that the plain
language of section 215a(a) gave no indication that the statute forbids an acquiring bank from
giving the minority shareholders cash alone. Id. Moreover, the NoDak court reasoned that
section 215a(a)(3) clearly contemplates the use of both cash and stock and does not proscribe
using both forms of consideration in combination. Id. Finally, the NoDak court stated that
the placement of the words "stock" and "cash" in the same sentence-each followed by the
parenthetical phrase "(if any)"-supported an interpretation that the statute permits the
exchange of stock for some of the acquired shares and cash for others. Id. Thus, the court
concluded that a merger that combined stock and cash consideration to freeze out minority
shareholders is not inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Id.
107 Id.
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minority shareholders have vested rights to retain an equity interest in the
resultant bank.' In addition, the court concluded that by promulgating
regulations designed to expedite a bank holding company's attainment of
100% ownership of a national bank,"19 the Comptroller effectively
108. Id. at 1421, see 12 C.F.R. § 5.33 (1992) (providing evaluative factors for approval
of proposed mergers and consolidations of national banks). The regulation states: "A merger
which would not have a substantially adverse effect on competition and which would be
beneficial to the merging banks and to the public normally will be approved." Id.
§ 5.33(b)(1). The regulation lists six factors that the Comptroller will consider in evaluating
a merger application:
(i) The effect of the transaction upon competition;
(ii) The convenience and needs of the community to be served;
(iii) The financial history of the merging banks;
(iv) The condition of the merging banks, including capital, manage-
ment and earnings prospects;
(v) The existence of insider transactions; and
(vi) The adequacy of disclosure of the terms of the merger.
Id. § 5.33(b)(2).
As the NoDak court observed, these factors do not include consideration of any vested
rights that minority shareholders might have to retain their shares in the resulting corporation.
NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1421. In fact, the regulation gives very little consideration to
the rights of shareholders at all, but rather focuses almost exclusively on the potential effects
that the proposed merger will have on competition and convenience. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.33(b)(2)-(5) (1992) (describing methods of determining magnitude of potential
anticompetitive effects and of measuring those effects against improved convenience and
needs resulting from proposed merger). The only reference to minority shareholders appears
in a section of the regulation titled "Policy on treatment of minority shareholders in mergers
and consolidations," which the Comptroller reserved for future use. Id. § 5.33(c).
109. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.21 (1992) (authorizing organization of interim national banks).
The regulation states in part:
This section applies to applications to organize an interim national bank. An
interim national bank is a new national bank which is organized solely to
facilitate the creation of a bank holding company or the acquisition of 100
percent of the voting shares of an existing bank. It is always part of a
proposed two-step process wherein the interim national bank, prior to
commencing business, will be a party to a merger or consolidation with an
existing bank.
Id. § 5.21(a). The Comptroller, noting that it is extremely difficult for a holding company
to acquire 100% of abank's stock through a straighttender offer, announced thatthe purpose
of this rule is to "eliminate duplication and delay in charter applications filed solely to
facilitate the creation of a new bank holding company or the acquisition of 100% of the
outstanding voting shares of an existing bank." 46 Fed. Reg. 16;661, 16,661 (1981).
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sanctioned the use of squeeze-out mergers." 0 The court stated that the
Comptroller's interpretation of the statute was not inconsistent with the
legislative history,"' which did not contain any specific statements about
squeeze-out mergers, but did reveal Congress's desire to facilitate national
bank mergers and consolidations."' The court concluded that Congress
deemed the section 215a(c) appraisal process adequate protection for
minority shareholders under these circumstances."'
110. NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1421. The NoDak court reasoned that the
Comptroller, by simplifying the use of interim bank mergers to facilitate the acquisition of
100% ownership of a national bank while explicitly refusing to prohibit interim bank mergers
that involve a freeze-out, effectively endorsed such transactions. Id.
111. Id. at 1422-23; see S. REP. No. 730, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1959), reprinted in
1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2232, 2237 (stating that purpose of 1959 Amendment was to improve
procedural and technical provisions governing consolidation and merger of national banks);
H.R. REP No. 2421, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2133,
2134 (declaring that purpose of amendment relating to dissenting shareholders was to bring
National Bank Act into parity with state statutes); H.R. REP. No. 408, 65th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1918) (stating that purpose of 1918 Act was to simplify consolidation of national banks by
removing necessity of liquidation). The NoDak court viewed the 1918 Act, and the
subsequent amendments m 1952 and 1959, as demonstrating Congress's desire to facilitate
mergers and consolidations of national banks. NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1422. The
court reasoned that to interpret the National Bank Act to permit squeeze-out mergers would
only further these legislative efforts to promote bank consolidations. Id. at 1422-23.
112. See id. at 1422 (concluding that congressional efforts to simplify procedural
requirements for mergers and consolidations demonstrated desire to encourage bank
consolidations).
113. See id. at 1423 (noting that § 215a(c) appraisal provision is statute's only
mandatory provision relating to treatment of dissenting shareholders); see also Bloomington
Nat'l Bank v Telfer, 699 F Supp. 190, 194 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (holding that reorganization
structured to eliminate minority shareholders without affording them appraisal rights violated
National Bank Act), aff'd, 916 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1990). The NoDak court reasoned that
the Telfer decision supported the court's conclusion that Congress sought to protect minority
shareholders through the appraisal provisions. NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1424. In
holding that a reverse stock split designed to freeze out minority shareholders without
appraisal rights violated the statute, the Telfer court observed:
Other sections of the National Bank Act make it clear that Congress is
concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders in a bank and
that when minority shareholders are in a position to be eliminated, Congress
intends for them to have appraisal rights. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 214a-215a. As
reflected in Beerly v. Department of the Treasury, 768 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 1184, 89 L. Ed.2d 301 (1986),
and in Nehring v. FirstDeKalb Bancshares, Inc., 692 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir.
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C. The Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Split
The NoDak majority strongly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning in Lewis."4 According to the NoDak court, the Lewis court
improperly framed the inquiry by focusing on whether the statute explicitly
authorizes squeeze-out mergers, rather than considering whether squeeze-
outs are inconsistent with the National Bank Act." 5 The Eighth Circuit
rejected the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that minority shareholders were
entitled to equal treatment absent a specific congressional decision to the
contrary 116 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Congress would have
prohibited squeeze-out mergers in the statute or through an amendment if it
intended to do so." 7 In Lewis, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
Congress did not intend for the statute to depart from the "longstanding
equity tradition of protection of minority shareholders in American
jurisprudence." ' s In contrast, the NoDak court, "embrac[ing] the modem
view" of squeeze-out mergers, rejected what the court considered "an
outmoded view of merger law "1119
1982), these sections of the Act provide a way for a national bank that wants
to become a wholly-owned subsidiary of a holding company to do so and cash
out minority shareholders in full compliance with the law. However, a
restructuring pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 215a requires that dissenters have
appraisal rights.
Telfer, 699 F Supp. at 194 (footnote omitted). The NoDak court pointed to this language
from the Telfer decision to reinforce the court's conclusion that squeeze-out mergers are
entirely permissible, as long as the minority shareholders are able to pursue their full
statutory appraisal rights. NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1424-25.
114. See NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1423-24 (suggesting Lewis court's opinion
reflects "strained reading" of National Bank Act).
115. Id. at 1423.
116. Id.
117 Id.
118. Lewis v Clark, 911 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
119. NoDak Bancorp. v Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1424 (8th Cir. 1993). While the
majority opinion in NoDak criticized the Lewis court for its "outmoded view" of squeeze-out
mergers, the dissent in NoDak argued that the majority should have considered Congress's
intent at the time of the National Bank Act's enactment-looking to the long-standing tradition
of protecting minority rights that prevailed at that time-rather than determining what
Congress might do today given the modem view of shareholder rights. Id. at 1425 (Heaney,
J., dissenting). Judge Heaney reasoned that if Congress intended to reject this tradition and
allow freeze outs, it would have done so expressly Id. at 1426. Judge Heaney asserted that
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V The Limited Scope of the National Bank Act
Both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits' opinions placed substantial
emphasis on congressional intent regarding the rights of minority sharehold-
ers under the merger provisions of the National Bank Act."2 The Lewis
court suggested that when Congress originally enacted the National Bank Act
section governing bank mergers and consolidations in 1918,21 it made
assumptions about certain core premises of then-existing state corporate
law 11 As the NoDak court observed, however, the laws governing
corporations have undergone substantial changes since 1918.11 Conse-
quently, understanding how these legal developments may have affected the
assumptions Congress made in amending the National Bank Act in 1959
requires an understanding of the legal environments that existed when
Congress acted in 1918 and 1959
A. The 1918 Act
Under the common-law theory of vested rights, shareholder unanimity
was a prerequisite to fundamental changes in a corporation.124 This
no indication existed that Congress intended to abandon this tradition. Id. at 1425.
According to the dissent, the NoDak majority disregarded this tradition because of an
"unjustified obeisance to the Chicago School of Economics." Id.
120. See NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1422 (stating that Congress's desire to facilitate
national bank mergers supported court's interpretation of National Bank Act); Lewis, 911
F.2d at 1561 (concluding that legislative history did not demonstrate congressional intent to
abandon long-standing equity tradition of protecting minority shareholders).
121. Act of Nov 7, 1918, ch. 209, 40 Stat. 1043 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 215a
(1988)).
122. See Lewis, 911 F.2d at 1561 (recognizing long-standing equity tradition of
protecting minority shareholders).
123. See NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1423-24 (discussing movement in corporate law
away from vested rights tradition to modem view of allowing squeeze-out mergers); Coleman
v Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 634 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981) (observing obsolescence of common-law rule
that entitled each minority shareholder power to veto merger); see also supra notes 53-58 and
accompanying text (discussing abandonment of vested rights theory under state corporate
law).
124. See, e.g., Voeller v Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941)
(noting common-law shareholder unanimity requirement for fundamental corporate changes);
Geddes v Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1921) (stating that to allow
majority shareholders to authorize sale of nonfailing corporation would defeat implied
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principle could apply to something as simple as expanding the business of
the corporation, as Kean v Johnson"z illustrates. 12 In Kean, a
corporation's majority shareholders attempted to expand the business beyond
the company's chartered purpose by selling the company's assets to another
corporation in exchange for stock." '  The mnnority shareholders chal-
lenged the transaction on the ground that the sale required their consent. 
12
contract among shareholders to pursue purpose for which corporation was chartered); Kean
v Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401, 418-20 (Ch. 1853) (enjoining sale of corporation's assets when
real purpose was to amend corporation's articles, which required unanimous shareholder
approval); see also Irving J. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and
Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420, 420 (1930) (explaining that unanimous consent of
shareholders was necessary in most jurisdictions for sale of all assets of solvent corporation,
for consolidation or merger, or for change in nature of business or financial structure); Weiss,
supra note 17, at 626-27 (noting that at common law, shareholders had right to retain their
stock interests and veto any fundamental change in corporation's business or charter).
125. 9 N.J. Eq. 401 (Ch. 1853).
126. See Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401, 418-19 (Ch. 1853) (enjoining sale of assets
when real purpose was to amend corporation's articles). In Kean, the court considered
whether the sale of a corporation's assets was valid without the consent of the minority
shareholders. Id. at 406. The minority shareholders owned shares in a company chartered
to operate a railroad between two cities. Id. at 402. In an attempt to extend the company's
operations, the majority shareholders arranged to sell the assets of the company to a second
company that the majority shareholders also controlled, which had the right to operate a
railroad to a third city Id. at 403. Under the terms of the sale, the second company would
pay for the corporate assets in stock. Id. The court concluded that the majority shareholders
did not have the right to force the sale of a successful corporation's assets merely because the
majority wanted to place its investment in another venture. Id. at 412-14. The Kean court
observed:
There is nothing, I think, therefore, in principle or authority, to shake the
conclusion already arrived at, that the sale of this road by the [company], at
a time when its affairs were eminently prosperous, did affect the rights of its
stockholders; that they had the right to retain their investment where it was,
and as it was, and that their rights are not satisfied by a payment to them of
their proportion in the proceeds of such sale.
Id. at 418. The court also suggested that the real purpose behind the transaction was
effectively to amend the company's articles of incorporation. Id. at 418-19. The court noted
that such a change required the unanimous approval of the shareholders, which the majority
had not obtained. Id. at 419-20. Consequently, the court enjoined the proposed sale,
granting relief to the minority shareholders. Id. at 424.
127 Id. at 403.
128. Id. at 404.
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The court, enjoining the sale, concluded that the majority shareholders did
not have the right to force the sale of an ongoing corporation because such
a sale would deny the minority shareholders the right to retain their
investment in the corporation. 29 The court also considered the sale unfair
because the transaction would have effectively amended the articles of the
corporation, which required the consent of all shareholders. 3 °
By 1918, most jurisdictions had retreated from the vested rights
theory, enacting statutes that authorized corporations to execute a variety of
fundamental transactions without the unammous consent of sharehold-
ers.' Under many of these statutes, shareholders who did not want to
participate in the reorganized corporation had the right to have the
corporation appraise and purchase their shares. But like the National Bank
Act, none of these state statutes expressly authorized the elimnnation of
minority shareholders from an ongoing concern." Consequently, judicial
hostility toward the use of these statutory powers to squeeze out minority
shareholders continued.1
33
One common form of abuse that courts sought to redress during the
period leading up to the 1918 Act involved squeeze outs by dissolution.
134
For example, Southern Pacific Co. v Bogert35 involved a squeeze-out
129. Id. at 418, 424.
130. Id. at 418-19.
131. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 629 (stating that state statutes authorized corporations
to carry out asset sales, mergers, consolidations, and voluntary liquidations upon approval
of majority or supramajority of corporations' shareholders).
132. See 1O'NEAL&THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 5:03, at 13 (discussing development
of merger statutes during early part of twentieth century).
133. Weiss, supra note 17, at 629.
134. See Ervin v Oregon Ry & Navigation Co., 27 F 625, 635 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1886)
(granting minority shareholders lien on property appropriated by majority shareholders
through dissolution sale); In re Paine, 166 N.W 1036, 1038-39 (Mich. 1918) (denying
petition for judicial dissolution when majority's goal was to drive out minority shareholders
by forced sale of their investment); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148,
152 (N.Y 1919) (granting cause of action to minority shareholder squeezed out by majority's
dissolution of closely held corporation); Theis v Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 74 P 1004,
1007 (Wash. 1904) (enjoining fraudulent dissolution by majority that would have deprived
minority shareholders of their interest in corporation); seealso Borden, supra note 61, at 990-
93 (stating that courts widely condemned dissolutions with squeeze-out motive on basis of
vested rights, fraud, fairness of price, and fiduciary duty).
135. 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
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scheme in which the controlling shareholders approved a voluntary
dissolution of the corporation and then purchased all of the corporate assets
through a newly formed company to the exclusion of the minority sharehold-
ers. 36 The United States Supreme Court, granting the minority sharehold-
ers relief, held that the majority's fiduciary relationship with the minority
prohibited the majority from denying the minority an opportunity to
participate in the "fruits" of the sale of the corporation's assets. 37 In
order to best ensure the minority's continued participation, the Supreme
Court required the majority to offer the minority a stock interest in the new
corporation. 3 In setting aside similar transactions, other courts inter-
vened to enforce the fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders,'
136. Southern Pac. Co. v Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 486 (1919). In Bogert, the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the validity of a reorganization plan involving the Houston &
Texas Central Railway Company (H & T Railway) under which the majority shareholder,
Southern Pacific Company (Southern Pacific), caused the corporation to dissolve voluntarily
Id. at 486. Southern Pacific acquired the assets of the dissolved corporation through a newly
formed company, Houston & Texas Central Railroad Company (H & T Railroad). Id.
Southern Pacific received all of H & T Railroad's stock, and the minority shareholders of the
old H & T Railway received nothing. Id. The Supreme Court, upholding the district court's
decree, declared that Southern Pacific held shares m the H & T Railroad in trust for the
minority shareholders because the reorganization plan had unfairly excluded the minority
from receiving shares in the new company Id. at 491-92. The Bogert Court explained that
Southern Pacific, as the majority shareholder, had a fiduciary duty to distribute the fruits of
its control on equal terms among the minority, even absent proof of fraud or mismanagement.
Id. at 492.
137 Id. at 487-88. In upholding the minority shareholders' challenge to the take-out
plan, the Bogert Court observed:
The rule of corporation law and of equity invoked is well settled and has been
often applied. The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it
occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as the
corporation itself or its officers and directors. If through that control a sale
of the corporate property is made and the property acquired by the majority,
the minority may not be excluded from a fair participation in the fruits of the
sale.
Id. (citing Memer v Hooper's Tel. Works, 9 L.R. Ch. 350, 353-54 (Ch. App. 1874)
(holding that majority shareholders may not authorize corporate action that benefits them to
detriment of minority shareholders)).
138. See id. at 493-94 (concluding that mere accounting and compensation in damages
was not sufficient remedy, but allowing defendant to raise remedy issue on remand).
139. See Ervin v Oregon Ry & Navigation Co., 27 F 625, 632 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1886)
(holding that majority violated fiduciary duty to minority by excluding minority from
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 763 (1994)
to prevent the fraudulent use of the dissolution statutes,140 or to protect
minority shareholders' right to participate in the profits of an ongoing
business. 4' The underlying theme of these dissolution cases was the
inequity of the majority's attempt to elimnate the minority from an ongoing
corporation. 42
In contrast to these dissolution squeeze-out schemes, the use of
squeeze-out mergers did not present a problem to courts during the period
preceding the 1918 Act. Squeeze-out mergers were not an issue for the
courts because the merger and consolidation statutes that were in place at
that time generally required that the shareholders in the participating
corporations receive shares in the surviving corporation. 43 Moreover,
none of the then-existing merger statutes specifically authorized cash as an
acceptable form of consideration in a merger.'" Therefore, a transaction
similar to the mergers involved in the Lewis and NoDak cases would not
have been possible under the various state statutory regimes that existed
before the 1918 Act.
participation in "fruits" of dissolution sale).
140. See Theis v Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 74 P 1004, 1006 (Wash. 1904) (stating
that dissolution for purpose of continuance of business by another corporation without
minority participation practically constituted fraud upon minority).
141. See Kavanaugh v Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148, 152 (N.Y 1919)
(finding that majority acted in bad faith by dissolving corporation in order to free itself from
minority interference or participation).
142. The Theis court described the inherent unfairness of the majority's treatment of the
minority under these dissolution take-out schemes:
If the enterprise fails, [the minority shareholders] bear their proportion of the
losses. If, on the other hand, it succeeds, as soon as it passes the experimen-
tal stage, and the opportunity is presented to finally reap the reward of a
judicious investment, they are cooly ejected from the corporation by a
majority of the stockholders, who appropriate to themselves the accruing
profits.
Theis, 74 P at 1007
143. See Coyne v Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154 A.2d 893, 895 (Del. 1959)
(observing that early Delaware statute did not permit payment of cash for shares surrendered
in merger or consolidation); Weiss, supra note 17, at 630 (discussing early statutes governing
mergers and consolidations).
144. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 632 (identifying Florida as first state to enact cash
merger statute by revising its general corporation law in 1925 to include cash among list of
permissible forms of consideration).
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The text and the legislative history of the 1918 Act reflected this legal
environment. Similar to the prevailing state corporate statutes govermng
mergers, the 1918 Act did not specify cash as an acceptable form of
consideration. 45 The 1918 Act allowed for consolidation "on such terms
and conditions as may be lawfully agreed upon" by directors -and sharehold-
ers of the consolidating banks. " Given the legal climate in which
Congress drafted this statute, Congress likely did not intend to allow a
consolidation agreement that forcibly eliminated the minority shareholders
from participation in the consolidated bank. 47 To the contrary, Congress
merely responded to the consolidation issue as it existed in 1918.
The legislative history of the 1918 Act indicates that Congress
intended to simplify consolidation of national banks.'" Prior to the 1918
Act, for two national banks to consolidate, one of the banks had to subject
145. See Act of Nov 7, 1918, ch. 209, § 1, 40 Stat. 1043, 1043 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 215a (1988)) (authorizing Comptroller to approve consolidation of two or more
national banks under "lawfully agreed upon" terms). The Act stated in part:
That any two or more national banking associations may, with the
approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, consolidate into one association
under the charter of either existing banks, on such terms and conditions as
may be lawfully agreed upon by a majority of the board of directors of each
association proposing to consolidate.
Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147 See supra notes 124-42 and accompanying text (discussmgjudicial hostility toward
take-out schemes prior to 1918 Act).
148. See H.R. REP No. 408, supra note 111, at 1 (stating that purpose of bill was to
simplify consolidation of national banks by removing necessity of liquidation). The House
Report for the 1918 Act reads in part:
This bill has but one object, and that is to simplify the consolidation of
existing national banks Under existing law if such consolidation is
desired, it is necessary for one of the banks to surrender its charter, and go
through the process of liquidation. It is the purpose of this bill to remove the
necessity of liquidation and permit the consolidation to take place upon the
affirmative vote of the stockholders of each association, such consolidation
being permitted under the charter of either of the existing banks. Proper
provision is made by the proposed law to protect any dissenting stockholder
in either corporation, who does not desire to be connected with the consolidat-
ed bank.
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itself to liquidation. 49 This requirement sometimes obstructed beneficial
consolidations if neither bank was willing to suffer the indignity of being
absorbed by the other. 50 In response to this perceived problem, Congress
drafted the 1918 Act to allow for consolidations on equal terms and thereby
facilitate useful combinations between national banks.' In seeking to
remove this impediment to beneficial consolidations, however, Congress did
not address the important and distinct policy questions associated with the
contemporary legal environment surrounding squeeze-out mergers.,
Given the prevalent assumptions about the rights of mnnority shareholders
in the period surrounding the 1918 Act' and the absence of state merger
statutes authorizing cash as consideration in mergers,'-' Congress almost
certainly would not have considered squeeze-out mergers an acceptable
method for facilitating consolidation of national banks.
B. The 1959 Amendment
The Lewis court concluded that by not expressly rejecting the
"longstanding equity tradition of protection of minority shareholders" when
enacting the 1959 Amendment, Congress intended that the statute not depart
from that tradition. 55  This conclusion suggests that congressional
assumptions about the rights of minority shareholders remained constant
during the interin between the 1918 Act and the 1959 Amendment. But,
this view fails to consider some of the fundamental developments in
corporate law that occurred during this period.
149. Id.
150. See S. REP No. 377, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1918) ("[lit has happened that banks
which might be advantageously brought together are kept apart from pride or unwillingness
of one or the other to be absorbed.").
151. See S. REP. No.406,65th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1918) ("This bill has the obvious
advantage of permitting the consolidation without compelling one bank to be absorbed by
another.").
152. See infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text (discussing escalating consolidation
trend in banking industry during 1980s and 1990s).
153. See supranotes 124-42 and accompanying text (discussingjudicial hostility toward
transactions designed to squeeze out minority shareholders).
154. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (discussing pre-1918 state merger
and consolidation statutes).
155. Lewis v Clark, 911 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
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The most significant development was the enactment in some
jurisdictions of merger statutes that authorized the use of cash as a form of
consideration in a merger." 6 While these cash merger statutes did not
explicitly authorize squeeze-out mergers, 157 majority shareholders soon
156. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 632 (discussing development of first cash merger
statutes). In 1925, Florida became the first state to revise its general corporation law to
authorize the use of cash as consideration in a merger or consolidation. Act of June 1, 1925,
1925 Fla. Laws ch. 10096, § 36, at 119, 135 (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.1101 (West 1993)). By 1931, lawmakers in Arkansas, California, and Ohio also had
enacted cash merger statutes. See Act of Apr. 1, 1931, Act 255, ch. 1, § 61, 1931 Ark. Acts
795, 861 (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-1001 (Michie 1991)); General Corp.
Law, ch. 862, § 361(1), 1931 Cal. Stat. 1762, 1809 (current version at CAL. CORP CODE
§ I101(d) (West 1990)); General Corp. Act, § 8623-67(a), 1927 Ohio Laws 9, 36 (current
version at OHIO REV CODE ANN. § 1701.78(B)(6) (Baldwin Supp. 1993)). In 1936, New
York enacted a cash short-form merger statute applicable to gas and electric companies that
owned 95% or more of their subsidiary's stock. Act of May 28, 1936, cl. 778, sec. 1,
§ 85(1), 1936 N.Y Laws 1658, 1658 (current version at N.Y. Bus. CORP LAW § 905(a)(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1994)). A short-form merger statute typically authorizes a company that
owns 90% or more of the stock of another company to merge the two corporations upon the
approval of the acquiring company's board of directors. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN
A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1120 (6th ed. 1988) (describing
short-form merger statutes). New York later extended its short-form merger statute to
include all corporations. Act of Apr. 22, 1949, ch. 762, sec. 1, § 85(1), 1949 N.Y Laws
1707, 1707 (current version at N.Y Bus. CORP. LAW § 905(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994)).
In 1957, Delaware adopted a short-form merger statute permitting cash as merger
consideration, modeled after the New York law. Act of June 5, 1957, cl. 121, see. 6,
§ 253(a), 51 Del. Laws 186, 188 (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a)
(1991)).
157 See Weiss, supra note 17, at 632-33 (discussing early cash merger statutes).
Although the cash merger statutes did not expressly authorize squeeze-out mergers, these
statutes are susceptible to varying interpretations. Id. One possible interpretation is that
these statutes authorize the use of cash only if all or a majority of a corporation's shareholders
are prepared to accept cash in exchange for their stock. Id. at 633. However, it is also
arguable that allowing the use of cash as the sole consideration for a merger serves the
purpose of authorizing squeeze-outs of minority shareholders because most mergers
contemplate the survival of one of the merging corporations. Id. Some commentators have
supported the second interpretation and argued that these cash merger statutes reflect a social
policy that prefers corporate flexibility and corporate democracy over notions of vested
rights. See id. (citing Borden, supra note 61, at 1026). Professor Weiss argued that this
position ignores the relevantlegal and business contexts in which the state legislatures enacted
these statutes. Id. Noting thejudicial hostility towards squeeze-out schemes, Weiss indicated
that contemporary legal opinion did not consider the legislatures to have authorized squeeze
outs by these statutes. Id. Weiss argued that the real purpose of the cash merger statutes was
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recognized the potential of these statutes to provide an effective means of
eliminating minority shareholders through cash-out mergers.' 58
The courts varied m their responses to squeeze-out mergers attempted
under these new statutes. For example, the New York Court of Appeals
upheld a squeeze-out merger under the state's short-form merger statute 59
by interpreting the statute to authorize such transactions."W In rejecting
the mnority shareholders' vested-rights claim, the court concluded that the
shareholders had only the right to the fair value of their investment and that
the right to appraisal afforded them adequate protection.'
The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals was consistent with
an earlier Delaware Supreme Court decision that allowed a parent-subsidiary
merger structured to eliminate accumulated and unpaid dividends on the
corporation's preferred stock.162 The Delaware Supreme Court stated that
a single shareholder could not block a fair and equitable merger that
complied with the statutory requirements of the Delaware merger stat-
ute. 63 According to the court, the dissenting shareholder's only remedy
was an appraisal. 164
These decisions suggest a significant change in the judicial attitude
toward the rights of minority shareholders. However, except for one other
case,' 6 state courts generally upheld minority shareholder challenges to
to provide corporate managers with more flexibility in structuring clearly permissible
transactions. Id. at 637 The statutes achieved this goal by removing artificial legal barriers
that made ordinary mergers riskier and more complicated. Id. at 637-38.
158. See Russell M. Robinson, II, Elimination of Minority Shareholders, 61 N.C. L.
REv 515, 517 (1983) (discussing early responses to cash merger statutes).
159. See Act of May 28, 1936, ch. 778, sec. 1, § 85(1), 1936 N.Y Laws 1658, 1658
(authorizing short-form mergers by public utility companies) (current version at N.Y Bus.
CoRP LAW § 905(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994)).
160. See Beloffv Consolidated Edison Co., 87 N.E.2d 561, 565 (N.Y 1949) (stating
that legislature enacted statute to facilitate mergers which would simplify complex structures
of public utility holding companies).
161. Id. at 564-65.
162. See Federal United Corp. v Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 337 (Del. 1940) (stating that
language of merger statute did not qualify or restrict corporations' power to merge).
163. Id. at 342.
164. Id. at 343.
165. See Matteson v Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025, 1036-37 (Wash. 1952) (rejecting
minority shareholder's challenge to squeeze-out merger that majority shareholders effected
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squeeze-out transactions in the period leading up to the 1959 Amend-
ment." The real shift in the judiciary's fundamental view toward
minority shareholders and the propriety of squeeze-out mergers did not come
until after Congress had drafted the 1959 Amendment. 167 Squeeze-out
mergers had not been an issue for most corporations or minority sharehold-
ers before this time for the simple reason that widespread adoption of cash
to recoup their investments from failing corporation). Matteson involved a claim for damages
by a minority shareholder who had attempted to block a proposed sale of all of the stock of
a failing corporation in order to secure payment of an unjustified premium for his shares. Id.
at 1029 After the minority shareholder refused to agree to the sale, the majority
shareholders formed a new company, transferred their shares to that company, and then
merged the two companies. Id. at 1029-30. Under the merger agreement, the new company
offered callable preferred stock in exchange for the stock of the old company, effectively
squeezing out the minority shareholder from equity participation in the surviving corporation.
Id. at 1030, 1034. The court upheld the merger, stating that the statute allowed a merger of
corporations formed for any lawful purpose. Id. at 1031. The court indicated that the
majority shareholders had formed the new company for the lawful purpose of carrying out
the sale of the corporation. Id. According to the court, this transaction was essential to the
corporation's survival. Id. at 1034.
Given the unique situation presented in Matteson, commentators have not read this
case as sanctioning squeeze-out mergers in general. See Borden, supra note 61, at 996
(suggesting that real significance of Matteson is that decision helped to focus inquiry on
reasons behind squeeze-out mergers); Vorenberg, supra note 63, at 1196 (suggesting that
Matteson court viewed merger as necessary step in beneficial sale of financially troubled
company); Weiss, supra note 17, at 646 (arguing that Matteson presented situation in which
court of equity might be justifiably hesitant to intervene).
166. See In re San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 127 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1942) (enjoining dissolution take-out scheme by relying on established principle that
controlling shareholders could not use dissolution statute to eliminate minority shareholders
from ongoing business); Eisenberg v Central Zone Property Corp., 115 N.E.2d 652, 655,
657 (N.Y 1953) (recognizing claim for injunction of series of complex transactions involving
conversion of minority shareholders' stock in New York corporation into certificates issued
by voting trust of Delaware corporation); see also Weiss, supra note 17, at 646 (noting that
state courts only approved one other squeeze-out merger during 1940s and 1950s).
167 See Stauffer v Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962) (holding that
Delaware short-form merger statute authorized squeeze-out mergers), overruled by Roland
Int'l Corp. v Najar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), overruled by Weinberger v UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154 A.2d 893, 896-97
(Del. 1959) (same); David I. Greene & Co. v Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del.
Ch. 1971) (interpreting Delaware long-form merger statute as allowing squeeze-out mergers);
Willcox v Stem, 219 N.E.2d 401, 404 (N.Y 1966) (upholding squeeze-out merger under
New York short-form merger statute).
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as permissible consideration in long-form mergers did not occur until the
1960s."6 No reason exists to believe that Congress in enacting the 1959
Amendment anticipated the change in judicial philosophy or intended to
reject the traditional assumptions about minority shareholders.
The NoDak court concluded that the legislative history of the 1959
Amendment revealed Congress's intent to facilitate national bank mergers
and consolidations.'69 In 1959, Congress amended the National Bank Act
to clarify or eliminate ambiguities in the statute. 7 ° The last significant
revision to the banking laws had occurred in 1935 171 In the interim,
Congress enacted many new banking laws, but neglected to coordinate these
additions and thereby left the banking statutes difficult to reconcile.'11
This problem was evident in the merger and consolidation provisions of the
1918 Act. 73 In an attempt to address the problem, Congress amended the
1918 Act "to make uniform the provisions relating to these consolidations
and mergers and to eliminate certain ambiguities." 174 However, Congress
168. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 648 (noting that judicial hostility toward take-out
schemes eroded only after state legislatures amended merger statutes, thereby signaling that
cash was acceptable consideration in all mergers). New York did not authorize cash under
its long-form merger statute until 1961. Business Corporation Law, ch. 855, § 902(a)(3),
1961 N.Y Laws 2356, 2428 (current version at N.Y Bus. CORP LAW § 902(a)(3)
(McKinney 1986)). Delaware amended its long-form merger statute to include cash in
1967 General Corporation Law, ch. 50, § 251(b)(4), 56 Del. Laws 151, 206 (1967)
(current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(5) (Supp. 1992)). In 1969, New
Jersey added provisions authorizing long-form and short-form cash mergers to its
corporation law N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A.10-1(2)(c), -5.1(1) (West Supp. 1993). The
Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association revised the Model Business
Corporation Act in 1969 to allow cash, as well. MODEL BusiNEss CORP Acr § 71(c)
(1969). The Committee had previously added an optional short-form cash merger provision
in 1959. MODEL BUSINESS CORP ACT § 68A (1959) (current version at MODEL BUSINESS
CORP AcT § 11.04 (1991)).
169. NoDak Bancorp. v Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1422 (8th Cir. 1993).
170. S. REP No. 730, supra note 111, at 1 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2232.
171. Id., reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2233.
172. Id.
173. See H.R. REP No. 694, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959) (describing "unjustified"
differences in legal requirements under various statutes governing consolidations and
mergers of national banks).
174. S.REP No. 730, supra note 111, at6, reprnted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at2237
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intended for the amendment to make only procedural and technical
improvements to the consolidation and merger provisions.7S
While Congress clearly sought to simplify and rationalize the
procedures for consolidating and merging national banks, the legislative
history does not suggest that Congress would have adopted squeeze-out
mergers as a means of facilitating this objective.'76 To the contrary, the
legislative history states that Congress "did not intend to affect in any way
the substantive authority of banks to consolidate or merge, or the substantive
authority of the Comptroller of the Currency to review and approve such
consolidations and mergers."'" Given the assumptions underlying the
1918 Act 7' and the judicial hostility toward squeeze-out attempts during
175. See id. (stating that committee did not intend for amendment to affect substantive
authority of banks to consolidate or merge). The Senate Report states:
Section 20 would amend the act of November 7, 1918 (40 Stat.
1043; 12 U.S.C. 33-34c), which relates to consolidations and mergers of
national banks and of State banks with national banks, in order to make
uniform the provisions relating to these consolidations and mergers and to
eliminate certain ambiguities. It would eliminate differences in the legal
requirements for publication, the requirements of notice of shareholders'
meetings, the waiving of such notice, the procedure to be followed in
determining dissenters' rights, and the payment for the expense of appraisal
or reappraisal made by the Comptroller of the Currency It would also
eliminate existing ambiguities as to the length of time a dissenting sharehold-
er may delay before proceeding with an appraisal, the time within which a
dissenter's stock must be surrendered, the length of time which must elapse
before the Comptroller can be asked to make a reappraisal, and the
disposition of the stock of dissenters.
The amendments contained in section 20 of the bill were intended
only to improve the procedural and technical provisions relating to
consolidations and mergers. The committee did not intend to affect in any
way the substantive authority of banks to consolidate or merge, or the
substantive authority of the Comptroller of the Currency to review and
approve such consolidations and mergers.
Id.
176. See id. (stating that Congress intended for amendments to make only technical
adjustments to consolidation provisions and did not intend to alter bank's substantive
authority to consolidate or merge).
177 Id.
178. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (concluding that Congress would
not have viewed squeeze-out mergers as permissible under 1918 Act).
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the period prior to the 1959 Amendment,'79 congressional assumptions
about the "substantive authority" of banks to merge did not include a belief
that majority shareholders had the power to effect a merger for the sole
purpose of eliminating minority shareholders or that the Comptroller
possessed the "substantive authority" to approve such a transaction."S
The legislative history of the 1959 Amendment indicates that Congress
never addressed the specific issue of the desirability or undesirability of
squeeze-out mergers.'' While Congress may have intended for the
procedural and technical improvements to facilitate beneficial consolidations
and mergers-as the NoDak court suggests-the amendment merely
addressed the problems that existed in 1959 "~ To read into the statute a
congressional endorsement of squeeze-out mergers simply ignores the
narrow objectives of the 1959 Amendment." Presumably, Congress
would have given some indication if it had intended to make broader changes
in the existing legal regime. In fact, the legislative history listed the few
substantive changes in authority that Congress intended to make, and
179. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (stating that courts generally were
hostile towards squeeze-out transactions before 1959 Amendment).
180. That Congress did not intend to change the substantive authority under the
merger and consolidation provisions of the Act is not surprising given the technical purpose
of the 1959 Amendments. See H.R. REP No. 694, supra note 173, at I (stating that
Congress designed statute primarily to repeal obsolete provisions and to eliminate existing
ambiguities in national banking laws). The House Report indicated that the only new
authority added under the 1959 Amendments related to: (1) change of location; (2) liability
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (3) timing of condition reports; (4) declara-
tion of dividends; (5) receipt of deposits by unregulated corporations; and (6) use of the
word "national" in the title of national banks. Id.
181. See S. REP No. 730, supra note 111, at 6, reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2237 (stating that Congress intended for 1959 Amendment to affect only technical and
procedural provisions governing national bank consolidations and mergers); H.R. REP. No.
694, supra note 173, at 1 (stating that purpose of 1959 Amendments was to clarify and
eliminate ambiguities and bring uniformity to merger and consolidation provisions). The
NoDak court acknowledged that the 1959 Amendment did not address the issue of squeeze-
out mergers, observing that "[t]he legislative history contains no direct statements about
freeze out mergers, either for or against." NoDak Bancorp. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416,
1422 (8th Cir. 1993).
182. See supra notes 172-73 (discussing problem of uncoordinated banking statutes).
183. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of 1959
Amendment).
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authority to squeeze-out minority shareholders was noticeably absent., '
Without a clear expression of Congress's intention to depart from contempo-
rary legal assumptions, Congress's silence regarding the propriety of
squeeze-out mergers as a method of facilitating bank consolidations indicates
an implicit intention to maintain the existing legal framework as to matters
not addressed."
VI. Policy Considerations
In interpreting the National Bank Act to permit squeeze-out mergers,
the NoDak court emphasized Congress's desire to facilitate bank consolida-
tions"8 and the Comptroller's endorsement of squeeze-out mergers.187
The NoDak court reasoned that reading the statute to authorize squeeze-out
mergers would further the policy of encouraging bank consolidations.8 8
This reading not only is inconsistent with the scope of the National Bank
Act, ' 9 but also may be contrary to the regulatory objectives that Congress
and federal banking agencies have sought to advance through the consolida-
tion process." Given the current trends in the banking industry, misap-
184. See supra note 180 (listing new authority that Congress granted in 1959
Amendment).
185. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L.
REV 1862, 1917 (1989) (arguing that legislators enact statutes to deal with specific
problems and leave matters not addressed in statute unchanged); see also L.H. LaRue,
Statutory Interpretation: Lord CokeRevisited, 48 U. Prrr. L. Rlv 733, 749 (1987) (noting
need to read statutes in relation to problem that legislators sought to address).
186. See NoDak Bancorp. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1422 (8th Cir. 1993) (reasoning
that interpreting National Bank Act to allow squeeze-out mergers would further Congress's
intent to encourage bank consolidations).
187 See id. at 1421 (concluding that Comptroller's interpretation of National Bank
Act and efforts to facilitate use of interim banks constituted endorsement of squeeze-out
mergers); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Comptroller's intention
to continue approving squeeze-out mergers outside Eleventh Circuit).
188. See NoDak Bancorp., 998 F.2d at 1423 (concluding that prohibiting squeeze-out
mergers would stifle bank consolidations).
189. See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text (describing limited objectives of
1959 Amendment to National Bank Act).
190. See infra note 210 (describing regulatory objectives that federal banking agencies
have sought to promote through bank consolidations).
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plying the National Bank Act's provisions governing mergers and consolida-
tions could have significant consequences.
The U.S. banking industry 9' currently is experiencing a period of
rapid change characterized by increasing competition and accelerating
consolidation." ,This consolidation trend began in the 1980s"93 and has
continued to escalate in the 1990s."9 Market forces"9 and legal changes
have facilitated the accelerated pace of bank consolidations. 96  The
increasing number and magnitude of recent bank mergers has prompted
191. The banking system in the United States includes state-chartered and nationally
chartered commercial banks, bank holding companies, savings and thrift institutions, and
credit unions. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 1 (1992); 1 MICHAEL P MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS § 1.2,
at 5 (1988). This Note's discussion of the banking industry focuses entirely on commercial
banks and bank holding companies.
192. See Rodgin Cohen, The New Phase of Bank Consolidations: Regulatory Issues
and Consideration, 27 WAKE FORESTL. REV 63, 63 (1992) (stating that process of bank
consolidation has entered new and accelerated phase); Geoffrey P Miller, Legal
Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REV 1083, 1086.
(1992) (stating that banking industry is undergoing consolidation of massive proportions);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of
Nationwide Banks, 77 IowA L. REv 957, 961 (1992) (arguing that consolidation trend of
1980s and early 1990s represents significant departure from long tradition of decentralized
banking in United States).
193. See Wilmarth, supra note 192, at 961 (noting that average rate of bank mergers
for 1980s doubled rate for 1970s and tripled rate for 1960s).
194. See Miller, supra note 192, at 1086-87 (citing figures that indicate that bank
merger transactions for 1990 and 1991 totaled more than $20 billion).
195. See Cohen, supra note 192, at 64 (explaining that both failing and healthy banks
view mergers as way to improve earnings); Miller, supra note 192, at 1088 (arguing that
much of merger activity is attributable to expansion of superregional banks into new
geographic markets); Wilmarth, supra note 192, at 964 (finding primary factor behind
consolidation trend to be decline in bank profitability due to intensified competitive
pressures resulting from geographic liberalization, greater entry of foreign banks, and
encroachment of nonbank competitors).
196. See Miller, supra note 192, at 1093 (identifying liberalization of legal restrictions
on interstate bank expansion as important factor in recent consolidation trend); Wilmarth,
supra note 192, at 959 (explaining that enactment of state laws allowing bank holding
companies to acquire banks across state lines has facilitated movement toward greater
consolidation).
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debate over whether the consolidation process will prove beneficial for the
banking industry, consumers, and the economy as a whole.'97
Opponents of bank consolidation warn of increasing ownership
concentration of banking assets, 98 inefficiency and regulatory costs, 199
enhanced risks and costs of failures,7 and anticompetitive effects."
Proponents welcome consolidation as a means of enhancing competition,'
197 Cohen, supra note 192, at 63. For a recent example of this debate, compare
Miller, supra note 192, at 1129-31 (arguing for furthering liberalization of laws restricting
geographic bank expansion and for allowing market to determine whether interstate branching
is beneficial), with Wilmarth, supra note 192, at 1081 (arguing against nationwide bank
consolidation and for continued regulatory restrictions on interstate branching) and Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., The Potential Risks of Nationivide Consolidation in the Banking Industry: A
Reply to Professor Miller, 77 IowA L. REv 1133, 1150 (1992) (arguing that Professor
Miller's proposal for unrestricted "market test" of nationwide banking would involve
excessive risks).
198. See Peter C. Carstensen, Public Policy Toward Interstate Bank Mergers: The Case
for Concern, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1397, 1427-28 (1989) (arguing that increased aggregate
concentration of banking resources would make banks less innovative and less responsive to
their role as risk-taking lenders supporting new business for national economic benefit);
Wilmarth, supra note 192, at 1078 (arguing that highly concentrated banking markets are less
competitive and less responsive to needs of consumers and small businesses).
199. See Carstensen, supra note 198, at 1415 (arguing that banks become less efficient
and generate additional regulatory costs associated with monitoring increasingly complex
organizations as they grow in size and spread over wider geographic areas); Wilmarth, supra
note 192, at 1008-09 (citing studies that show that banks suffer from diseconomies of scale
after they reach certain size and that larger banks are not more efficient and would probably
be less efficient than midsized banks).
200. See Carstensen, supra note 198, at 1417 (arguing that regulators have greater
difficulty monitoring large banks for trouble and that bailing large banks out of trouble will
be costlier to taxpayers than bailing out smaller banks); Wilmarth supra note 192, at 994-95
(asserting that nationwide consolidation would expose taxpayers to greater losses by
concentrating bank deposits in small number of nationwide banks, which federal regulators
under their "too big to fail" policy would not allow to fail without paying off uninsured
depositors).
201. See Carstensen, supra note 198, at 1418-21 (arguing that combinations of large
banks will result in loss of actual and potential competition and will increase risk of
oligopolistic linkages that are harmful to competition); Wilmarth, supra note 192, at 1020-22,
1024-28 (arguing that increased concentration of banking markets will lessen competition and
that current application of antitrust laws will not restrain consolidation of market power
within banking industry).
202. See John P Danforth, Merger Economies and Recent Trends in Bank Consolida-
tion, BANKING POL'Y REP., Oct. 7, 1991, at 1, 9 (arguing that competition within banking
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increasing consumer service, 3 and improving the safety and soundness
of the banking Industry,' while discounting any social costs attributable
to increased concentration of bank ownership. 205
Although the question of who ultimately will prevail in this debate is
unclear, the federal agencies responsible for supervising U.S. banks'
have strongly endorsed the consolidation process as a means of strengthening
the banking system and enhancing bank safety and soundness.' More-
industry and from foreign banks and nonbank competitors will create difficulty for banking
combinations in establishing sustainable market power and will compel banks to pass on
substantial portion of any gains in efficiency arising from mergers to banking public); Miller,
supra note 192, at 1112-13 (arguing that elimination of restrictions on geographic bank
expansion would increase competition in banking industry by opening banking markets to
entry of potential competitors and thereby deter existing banks from engaging in monopolistic
pricing or other anticompetitive behavior).
203. See Danforth, supra note 202, at 9 (suggesting that consumers will benefit from
efficiency gains that banks achieve from mergers through lower prices and improved
services); Miller, supra note 192, at 1108-10 (arguing that geographic bank expansion would
enhance quality of services provided to customers by providing consumers with convenience
of conducting banking transactions away from home and by allowing larger banks to enter
local markets and compete on loans and other services).
204. See Miller, supra note 192, at 1102-05 (arguing that larger banks are less risky than
smaller banks because larger banks can achieve greater geographical diversification in their
loan portfolios).
205. See id. at 1119, 1121 (arguing that although consolidation increases bank
concentration, banking industry in United States is much less concentrated than in other
countries and that little evidence exists that large banks presently exert undue political power
as compared to smaller banks or other groups).
206. The three federal agencies responsible for the supervision and regulation of banks
are: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(Comptroller). 1 ALFRED M. POLLARD ET AL., BANKiNG LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 4.04, at 4-7 (2d ed. 1992). The Bank Merger Act (BMA) governs bank mergers and the
acquisition of assets and assumption of liabilities by banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1988).
Under the BMA, the agency that has primary responsibility for the acquiring or surviving
bank must approve the transaction. Id. § 1828(c)(2). The primary agency is the Comptroller
for a national bank, the Federal Reserve for a state bank that is a member of the Federal
Reserve System, and the FDIC for a state bank that is not a member of the Federal Reserve
System. Id. § 1828(c)(2)(A)-(C). Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA),
the Federal Reserve also must approve the acquisition of a bank by "a company" and the
merger of bank holding companies. Id. § 1842.
207 See Bank Mergers: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
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over, Congress recently has moved closer to enacting proposed legislation
that would allow banks to operate nationwide branch networks.08 Passage
of this legislation would likely accelerate the current wave of bank consolida-
tions, as large banks would rush to develop nationwide branch networks.9
However, allowing squeeze-out mergers in the context of national banks
might not advance the regulatory objectives that Congress and the federal
banking agencies have sought to promote through consolidation.210
Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 159, 161 (1991) [hereinafter Bank Mergers Hearings]
(testimony of RobertL. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency) (stating that consolidations that
promote competition can improve safety and soundness of banking industry); id. at 183
(testimony ofJohn P LaWare, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
(arguing that consumers of financial services will benefit from mergers in which more
efficient banks are able to convert less efficient banks into low-cost competitors); Deposit
Insurance and Banking Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Budget,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1991) (statement of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC, and
Chairman, RTC) (stating that removal of interstate banking restrictions would result in
decreased risk through diversification and increased competition).
208. See Kenneth H. Bacon, Nationwide-Bank Bill Picks Up Steam as Even Opponents
See Measure Passing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1994, at A3 (stating that bankers are confident
that Congress will pass law that removes remaining restrictions on interstate branching);
Kenneth H. Bacon, Nationwide Bank Bill Clears Senate Panel, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1994,
at A2 [hereinafter Bacon, Bill Clears Senate Panel] (reporting that bill that would allow banks
to operate nationwide branch networks cleared Senate Banking Committee and appears
headed for passage in current Congress); Albert R. Karr, House Panel Votes to Give Banks
Ability to Form Interstate Branch Networks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1994, at A2 (reporting
House Banking Committee's approval of legislation allowing banks to operate nationwide
branch networks). Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have bills pending that
would permit nationwide bank branching. S. 371, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 459,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
209. Bacon, Bill Clears Senate Panel, supra note 208, at A2.
210. In his statement to the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
the Comptroller indicated that the federal banking agencies have focused on three issues in
reviewing proposed bank mergers: the capital adequacy of the resulting bank, the needs and
convenience of the public, and the effect on competition. Bank MergersHearings, supra note
207, at 13 (statement of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency). The Comptroller
strongly endorsed the consolidation process, stating that beneficial mergers "improve the
operating efficiency of the merging banks, and mergers that enable banks to extend the
geographic scope of their operations can reduce their exposure to local or regional economic
shocks. " Id. at 14. The Comptroller suggested that such transactions would have the overall
effect of improving the safety and soundness of the banking industry by increasing bank
profitability and diversification, which would enable banks to become better capitalized and
less susceptible to economic downturns. Id.
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A merger effected for the sole purpose of squeezing out the minority
shareholders-thereby transferring value from the minority to the majority
shareholders-would do nothing to achieve the significant operating
efficiencies or economies of scale that proponents of consolidation claim to
be driving the current wave of bank mergers.2 ' Merely rearranging the
internal ownership interests of a bank would not necessarily have any effect
on competition or improve customer service.212 Yet proponents of bank
mergers attribute such benefits to consolidation. 213  No obvious reason
exists to explain why a bank could not achieve these same objectives in a
merger that did not eliminate the minority shareholders' interests.214
Moreover, squeeze-out mergers increase the concentration of banking assets
on both the corporate and shareholder levels, magnifying whatever risks that
higher concentration may present to the banking system and the public. 215
Consequently, the Comptroller's misreading of the National Bank Act and
211. See PETERS. ROSE, THEINTERSTATEBANKING REVOLUTION84 (1989) (suggesting
that possible motives for interstate bank expansion are increased profitability, gains in
efficiency, and diversification); Cohen, supra note 192, at 65 (stating that mergers have
allowed banks to achieve substantial cost savings by combining operations and eliminating
overlapping branches and administrative overhead); Danforth, supra note 202, at 8 (arguing
that banks have sought to gain increased operating efficiency from rationalization of delivery
systems and implementation of improved management practices that are available through
merger).
212. See Bank Mergers Hearings, supra note 207, at 158 (testimony of Robert L.
Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency) (stating that transactions in which bank holding
company merges two or more subsidiaries to form single bank ordinarily would have no
effect on public service or competition because banks involved already are commonly owned
before merger).
213. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (discussing proponents' arguments
in favor of bank consolidation).
214. The NoDak court reasoned that disallowing squeeze-out mergers would allow
minority shareholders to block an efficient consolidation or merger transaction by refusing
to give their consent. NoDak Bancorp. v Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1422-23 (8th Cir. 1993).
However, the court clearly overstated the case. Properly reading the National Bank Act to
prohibit squeeze-out mergers would not subject all merger plans to a potential minority
challenge, but rather only those mergers that would forcibly eliminate the minority from
participation in the surviving bank.
215. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing potential problems
associated with increased concentration from consolidation). But see supra note 205 and
accompanying text (discounting effects of increased concentration resulting from bank
consolidations).
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endorsement of squeeze-out mergers will do little to advance the regulatory
objectives that Congress and the federal banlang agencies have sought to
promote through consolidation2r 1 6 and may needlessly increase the level of
concentration in the banking industry
Congress ultimately must decide whether allowing squeeze-out
mergers under the National Bank Act would further the policy of facilitating
beneficial bank consolidations. Congress may well choose to adopt an
approach similar to that of the Weinberger court and rely on the right of
appraisal as adequate protection for minority shareholders in a squeeze-out
merger.1 7 The NoDak court basically endorsed this approach in upholding
the Comptroller's authority to approve squeeze-out mergers under the
National Bank Act.2 ' However, this approach would do little to further
the regulatory objectives that Congress has sought to achieve through
consolidation2 9 or to protect minority shareholders' interests.'
If Congress does decide to permit squeeze-outs under the National
Bank Act, Congress should follow the Alpert court's approach by applying
a business purpose test.3' A business purpose test would provide greater
protection to mnnority shareholders by requiring that the majority sharehold-
ers act in the interests of the corporation and not merely in their own self-
interest.m Some commentators have questioned the efficacy of the busi-
216. See supra note 210 (discussing regulatory objectives that federal banking agencies
have sought to promote through consolidation).
217 See Weinbergerv UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,714 (Del. 1983) (relying on appraisal
as exclusive remedy for minority shareholders in squeeze-out merger). For a further
discussion of Weinberger, see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
218. See NoDakBancorp., 998 F.2d at 1423 (concluding thatCongress deemed appraisal
process adequate protection for minority shareholders in squeeze-out mergers).
219. See supra notes 210-16 (concluding that permitting squeeze-out mergers will not
necessarily further regulatory objectives attributable to bank consolidation).
220. See Douglas V Austin & Kim Nigem, Dissenters' Appraisals Revisited, 106
BANKING L.J. 246, 264-65 (1989) (concluding that appraisal under National Bank Act is
expensive, time-consuming, and unlikely to result in dissenters' achieving price significantly
higher than merger price; basing conclusion on survey of Comptroller's appraisal valuations
over five-year period).
221. See Alpert v 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19,28 (N.Y 1984) (holding that
majority shareholder must demonstrate valid purpose for treating minority shareholders
unequally). For a further discussion ofAlpert, see supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
222. See Alpert, 473 N.E.2d at 28 (requiring squeeze-out mergers to have independent
corporate purpose).
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 763 (1994)
ness purpose test as a standard for establishing fairness in a squeeze-out
merger.' However, these comments focus predominantly on the
Delaware courts' application of the standard before Weinberger I The
pre-Weinberger approach in Delaware recogmzed the purposes of both the
parent and the subsidiary in determining whether the merger had a legitimate
business purpose.' Congress could avoid this apparent weakness by
following the lead of the Alpert court, which adopted a more rigorous
business purpose test that required an independent corporate objective
unrelated to the interests of the controlling shareholders.' Moreover,
Congress could enact a standard that would not "stifle" beneficial bank
consolidations 7 by defining the business purpose test in terms of the
regulatory objectives that the federal banking agencies have sought to
promote through consolidation.' Under this standard, the majority
shareholders could squeeze out the minority shareholders for the purpose of
advancing one of the regulatory objectives. 229 Such a standard also would
avoid the ambiguity concerning what constitutes a legitimate business
223. See Booth, supra note 7, at 526 (stating that business purpose test is little more than
excuse to allow minority shareholders opportunity to litigate rather than relegating them to
appraisal remedy); Robinson, supra note 158, at 522 (arguing that business purpose test is
mechanical at best because courts do not require controlling shareholders to have compelling
purpose for squeezing out minority shareholders); Weiss, supra note 17, at 667-71 (noting
difficulty of defining what constitutes proper purpose in squeeze-out when eliminating
minority is primary purpose).
224. See supra notes 26-36 (describing Delaware courts' application of business purpose
test to squeeze-out mergers).
225. See Tanzer v International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Del. 1977)
(holding that parent company did not breach its fiduciary duty as majority stockholder in
subsidiary by effecting merger primarily to advance its own business purpose), overruledby
Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
226. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (describing Alpert court's application
of business purpose test to squeeze-out mergers).
227 See NoDak Bancorp. v Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1423 (8th Cir. 1993) (suggesting
that allowing minority shareholders to challenge squeeze-out mergers would stifle bank
consolidations).
228. See supra note 210 (describing regulatory objectives that federal banking agencies
have sought to promote through consolidation).
229. Cf. Alpertv 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 29 (N.Y 1984) (holding that
capital considerations driving squeeze-out merger constituted valid corporate purpose).
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purpose, a problem with which courts have struggled in applying the
standard to squeeze-out mergers involving nonbank corporations."
VIL Conclusion
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits' opimons present two very different
approaches that other federal courts mght take when addressing the issue of
squeeze-out mergers under the National Bank Act. Courts should take care
to read the statute within the legal context that existed when Congress
drafted the merger and consolidation provisions. The narrow objectives of
the statute clearly do not indicate a congressional endorsement of squeeze-
out mergers. While legal assumptions regarding the propriety of squeeze-out
mergers have changed, Congress-not the courts or the Comptroller-must
decide whether these changes would be appropriate in the context of the
National Bank Act. If Congress does decide to allow national banks to
engage in squeeze-out mergers, applying the suggested business purpose
standard to such transactions would protect mnnority shareholders from
mergers designed solely to eliminate their interests without stifling beneficial
consolidations that actually promote desired regulatory objectives.
Thomas W Maddi
230. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 670 (arguing that inability of courts to articulate what
represents proper business purpose poses insurmountable problem in applying standard).
Professor Weiss suggests that because of the difficulty in defining what constitutes a valid
purpose, the courts might apply the test in a highly subjective manner, depending on whether
the court emphasizes the merger's squeeze-out elements or economic components. Id.
Arguably, this ambiguity about the standards for proper purpose creates uncertainty and
increases the risk of litigation for merger participants. Id. at 670-71.

